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ARTICLES
STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING WORKPLACE
REPRODUCTIVE AND HEALTH PROGRAMS
Christine Neylon O'Brien *
and
Margo E. K. Reder**
The Supreme Court's general prohibition of sex-specific employer fetal
protection policies as a method of protection against toxic work environment
liability has increased concern about reproductive and developmental hazards
present in our workplaces. Rather than allowing negative health and economic
outcomes to result from continued inattention to these important issues, businesses
and employees must now work cooperatively to institute Reproductive and Health
Programs that will improve the health of all workers and their potential offspring.
This may be accomplished through both private and public initiatives that
comprehensively address the significant issue of toxic work environments. Oc-
cupational safety and health research must be conducted so as to assess all risks
in a gender neutral fashion. This research must be integrated into workplace
policies and implemented by safety and health committees as part of an overall
program. Reproductive and Health Programs should now be identified as a
workplace priority.
I. WORK ENVIRONMENTS CONTAIN REPRODUCTIVE AND
DEVELOPMENTAL HAZARDS: AN ENDURING DILEMMA
The numbers of occupational injuries and illnesses are daunting. The costs
are simply staggering and the suffering is incomprehensible. Protecting the
reproductive health and procreative capacity of all workers, and consequently the
health of their offspring, has received far too little attention in relation to its
vital importance.
It is estimated that up to 20 million jobs in the United States expose workers
to chemicals, metals and other products suspected of causing reproductive injury.'
Moreover, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
ranks reproductive impairment as the sixth leading work-related disease or injury.
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1. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT: THE COMPLETE HANDBOOK
ON DISCRIMINATION, MATERNITY LEAVE AND HEALTH AND SAFETY 57 (1987) [hereinafter BNA HAND-
BOOK].
2. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE 5 (1985)
[hereinafter OTA REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH REPORT].
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The cost of these injuries to the nation is estimated to be $83 billion for medical
expenses and lost work-time costs.3 These statistics cannot help but look grim
when it is apparent that such occupational disease and injury is "almost entirely
preventable."
4
Employers have historically failed to tackle the issue of reproductive and
developmental hazards in the workplace. Negative reproductive outcomes generally
have been attributed only to female employees, who were channeled into non-
industrial jobs. Male employees traditionally have been considered reproductively
invulnerable and thus worked in the more hazardous industrial jobs. Strides have
recently been made both at eradicating this gender segregation in the workplace,
and in focusing attention on toxins in the workplace. This is due in part to the
Supreme Court decision, International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI).5
In prohibiting employers from relying on fetal protection policies (FPPs) which
exclude women from jobs "just because of their ability to become pregnant,"
the Court criticized policies that do not "seek to protect the unconceived children
of all its employees." 6
JCI may be the first significant judicial decision to give employers the
incentive to address reproductive and developmental risks arising in the workplace.
The Court moved the issue of reproductive toxins in the workplace "to a central
position in the public consciousness" and "portended critical issues" of exposure
to reproductive hazards, how best to avoid such injury, and how to compensate
for it.'
What JCI fails to accomplish is a clear, cogent reconciliation of the many
complex issues beyond the sex discrimination claim, issues that encompass the
reproductive safety and health of all workers and their offspring.' JCI in many
ways reflects onto, and affirms the status quo of today's workplaces. The decision
does not affirmatively protect equality and safety, but rather attempts to prohibit
unequal treatment. 9 The Court protects women's rights to decide whether to
3. RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIva JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 52 (1991) ($32 billion relates to health care with the balance attributed to work loss). See
also Matthew P. Weinstock, OSHA Reform: The Push for Worker Involvement, OCCUPATIONAL
HAZARDS, Dec. 1991, at 37; Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act, 1991:
Hearings on S.1622 Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on
Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1991) [hereinafter COSHRA Senate Hearings] (statement of Dr.
Eula Bingham, Professor of Environmental Health, Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine). See
generally Clinton Signs Legislation Extending Jobless Benefits, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at
A-A (Mar. 5, 1993) (citing Representative Ford's statement that COSHRA is aimed at reducing an
estimated 10,000 job-related deaths, 1.7 million injuries and 390,000 cases of occupational disease
each year).
4. See COSHRA Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 92 (statement of Dr. Philip Landrigan,
Director of Division of Environmental and Occupational Medicine, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine).
5. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
6. Id. at 1202, 1203.
7. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic Hazards in the Workplace: Chal-
lenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers' Compensation Systems, 60 FORDHAM L. REVIEw 843,
845-46 (1992).
8. See JCI, 111 S. Ct. at 1196. The JCI Court responded as only a court has jurisdiction to,
and resolved the Title VII claim. To respond to the larger challenge presented requires leadership
from both government and employers.
9. Id. at 1210. See Robin West, Note, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REV. 441 (1992);
[Vol. 19:97
Workplace Reproductive Health Programs
choose a job involving exposure to toxins but still forces both women and men
to choose between their economic health and reproductive health in many
instances.' 0 JCI has value, though, in that it exposed the problem of reproductive
and developmental toxicants in the workplace and the fact that all workers, their
offspring, and third parties continue to risk their health to the extent that the
problem is ignored.
The costs of this collective problem of occupational reproductive injuries
and disease have been largely externalized, passed on and forgotten; it is viewed
as the employee's problem alone. It has become recognized, however, that these
are no longer invisible costs of doing business. An enormous challenge is here -
to address and consequently improve the reproductive and developmental health
of all workers and their potential offspring. The response must equal the
challenge.
Even though there are laws to protect workers' safety and health, they have
not efficiently addressed problems relating to reproductive health.' There are
unprecedented numbers of toxic chemicals and processes used in all workplaces,
including offices. 12 Indeed, the safety of many of the chemicals used is not even
yet known. And given the current legal climate, there is almost an incentive not
to change this. 3 In our increasingly competitive economy, safety and health issues
have lagged as a priority. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), the agency primarily responsible for workplace safety, has had "limited
effectiveness.' ' 4 How can we then address and resolve the compelling problems
of occupational exposure to reproductive and developmental hazards?
The authors assert two primary avenues for responding to workplace repro-
ductive risks: first, one that incorporates a private prospectus for Reproductive
and Health Programs (RHPs) and secondly, a public mandate for comprehensive
analysis and action regarding reproductive risks in employment. The integration
of these two schemes, private and public, would represent a substantive solution
to the pretermitted problem of reproductive and developmental harm engendered
in the workplace.
Jennifer Morton, Comment, Pregnancy in the Workplace - Sex-Specific Fetal Protection Policies -
UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc. - A Victory for Women?, 59 TENN. L. REv. 617 (1992). Cf. EEOC
Policy Guide on Supreme Court's Johnson Controls Decision (June 28, 1991), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 405:6941 (Aug. 1991) (EEOC rescinded prior policy guides pursuant to JCI decision).
10. See generally Sherry F. Colb, Words That Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Responses
to Fetus-Envy, 72 B.U. L. REV. 101, 128-39 (1992).
11. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPRODUCTIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL ToxIcANTs: REGu-
LATORY ACTIONS PROVIDE UNCERTAIN PROTECTION 65-68 (1992) [hereinafter GAO RtPRODUCTIVE
HAZARD REPORT]; REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE, SYLLABus FOR CLINICIANS, Occu-
PATIONAL AND ENVIORNMENTAL REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS CENTER 42 (Maureen Paul ed., 1990). While
our workplaces are full of toxins, few have been studied, especially with respect to reproductive
outcomes. Where reproductive outcomes have been considered, there has been a disproportionate
focus on maternal mediation of harm.
12. See generally Christine Neylon O'Brien et al., Employer Fetal Protection Policies at Work:
Balancing Reproductive Hazards with Title VII Rights, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 147 (1991).
13. See generally Eggen, supra note 7, at 911.
14. See S. REP. NO. 453, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992).
15. See Christine Neylon O'Brien & Margo E. K. Reder, Modeling an Employment Policy to
Unify Workers' Rights with Fetal Protection, 24 Aiz. ST. L.J. 1149 (1992) (introducing the concept
of a reproductive health program as a means to address this unresolved problem, while supplanting
traditional fetal protection policies).
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II. REPRODUCTIVE AND HEALTH PROGRAMS: A PRIVATE
RESPONSE
Reproductive and Health Programs are designed to improve the reproductive
health of all workers within the context of broader safety and health programs
(SHPs). RHPs, as outlined herein are, at least initially, 6 private voluntary
cooperative programs that highlight worker involvement in assessing and decreas-
ing reproductive impairment or injury that is exacerbated by workplace exposures.
A new emphasis is placed upon reproductive risks impacting on men and women
alike. These programs monitor the existing practices in the work environment
while supporting gender-balanced research of suspected hazards and known toxins.
RHPs incorporate readily into existing SHPs or provide an impetus for
adopting a safety and health framework with an RHP as its centerpiece. Such
programs need not displace the traditional function of unions as advocates for
worker safety and health where unions serve as collective bargaining representa-
tives. Rather, collective bargaining representatives that have experience with joint
labor-management safety and health committees (SHCs) are a valuable resource,
even a foundation for RHPs.
RHPs can be structured so as not to interfere with the policies and purposes
of the National Labor Relations Act. In particular, employers must be sensitive
to the strictures of Section 8(a)(2), which prohibits employer domination or
assistance of a labor organization. 7 Establishing employer-employee action com-
mittees in the area of safety and health need not conflict with employees' Section
7 right to freely form or join a labor organization. In the event of the onset
of an organizational campaign by a union, an employer who is aware of such
16. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text (discussing pending legislative proposals).
Eventually, and perhaps ideally, the RHP model may be mandated pursuant to OSH Act Amendments
or through administrative rulemaking.
17. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-87 (West Supp. 1992). [hereinafter
NLRAI; 29 U.S.C.A. §158(a)(2) provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by
the Board pursuant to section 156, of this title, an employer shall not be prohibited
from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of
time or pay.
29 U.S.C.A. § 152(5) (West. Supp. 1992) defines a labor organization as "any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for this purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." This
section has been broadly interpreted to include employee committees that "deal with" employers.
NLRB v. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203, 205 (1959).
18. 29 U.S.C.A. §157 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized
in section 8(a)(3).
See generally David F. Girard-diCarlo et al., Legal Traps in Employee Committees, 43 LAB. L. J.
671 (1992).
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activity should be cautious about illegally interfering with employee choice or
appearing to offer an RHP with joint membership of employees and management
as a substitute for a union.' 9 If a union is the exclusive representative for a
bargaining unit at a company, the employer may not bypass the union on safety
issues. 20 Thus, the formation and administration of RHPs in a union setting
legally necessitates the cooperation and/or participation of the employees' collec-
tive bargaining representative. In the fairly common situation where a company
recognizes several different unions for various bargaining units, each union should
have a representative on a joint SHC.
Certainly the most successful and cooperative joint labor-management SHCs
serve as a prototype for privately adopted RHPs. Similar joint SHCs have also
been instituted pursuant to OSHA settlements in its egregious litigation program, 2'
which stands as testimony to the OSH Agency's perception that committees with
worker involvement are a necessary vehicle to improved health and safety in the
workplace. As will be discussed in Part III, a blueprint for joint SHCs is
mandated under recent proposals to amend the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSH Act). 22
The basic structure of an RHP will depend in part upon the size and nature
of the business. Because worker involvement is critical to the success of RHPs,
there should be an equal number of management and employee representatives
on a joint SHC. These committees generally would be charged with oversight,
inspection and improvement of work conditions that may lead to reproductive
harm. The model RHP is flexible, yet it promises guidance for employers and
employees alike. This guidance would be updated by the information derived
from the interactive efforts of the participants in these programs.
By design, the RHP coordinates data collection, both on site and from
research literature, and ensures that data regarding reproductive outcomes are
recorded and maintained for epidemiologic study with a minimum invasion of
the workers' privacy. Many companies may not be able to merely rely upon
passive collection of research regarding the effects of toxins on reproductive
health because of the lack of gender-comparative studies and because of the
previous exclusion of fertile women from more hazardous occupations.
Because some enterprises may view the cost of research as exceeding the
benefits to be derived from such, it may be difficult for RHPs/SHCs to conduct
new research within the individual enterprises that generate or utilize toxins.
23
19. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (1992).
20. See E.I. DuPont, 4-CA-18737. (NLRB General Counsel alleges § 8(a)(5) failure to
bargain in good faith as well as § 8(a)(2) domination and assistance where employer
instituted seven employer-employee committees in the context of a collective bargaining
relationship). See generally Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies For Employment Rights:
Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 545 (1992).
21. Remarks of Sue Ann Wolf, Address Before the Twenty-first Annual Joint Labor Law
Conference (Oct. 22, 1992) (regarding outcome of egregious litigation program). See also Summers,
supra note 20, at 506 n.308.
22. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text (discussing Comprehensive Occupational Safety
and Health Reform Act). What is missing from these proposals is any mention of reproductive health
problems.
23. See generally Eggen, supra note 7, at 911-12. Professor Eggen recommends legislative
imposition of information gathering and judicial encouragement of employer accountability for
workplace injuries in light of her perception that industry currently has few economic incentives to
institute health and safety improvements or information gathering. Id.
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Nonetheless, the function of SHCs must be to ensure that scientific research
about the effects of reproductive hazards in the workplace is prioritized and
contributed to both internally and externally.
An excellent example of privately funded research is a recent study sponsored
by the Semiconductor Industry Association, a manufacturer's trade group. The
study was undertaken by the University of California at Davis "to test the
hypothesis that fabrication work in the silicon-based semiconductor industry was
associated with increased risk of miscarriage or spontaneous abortion. '
24 Com-
pleted in 1992, the study concluded that exposures to chemicals in this work are
"likely causal agents" of negative reproductive outcomes. 2 The study concluded
by offering a host of recommendations for companies as well as agencies.
2 6
RHPs also require educating workers about self-protection. All workers
should be educated about reproductive and health risks before entering hazardous
work environments. The focus of training must include awareness of the possi-
bilities of males and females sustaining harm and mediating harm to offspring.
This holistic approach to reproductive health as well as general safety and health
harmonizes with the growing trend toward adopting ethical codes as corporate
policy. Rather than defiling the health prospects of current and future generations,
RHPs make reproductive health a corporate goal, one that coincides with ethical
theory and practice.
RHPs, within the vehicle of SHCs, instigate ongoing improvements in the
area of reproductive and general health. A schedule of worksite inspections and
medical monitoring for variables that impact upon reproductive health is readily
achievable and a vital step toward mitigating hazards and understanding their
consequences.
Employers can gain useful knowledge from the experience of SHCs in the
United States and in other countries. For example, in the former German
Democratic Republic (GDR), every enterprise had an occupational safety subcom-
mittee to carry out inspections, investigate accidents, diseases and work-related
illnesses, and submit proposals for improving workplace safety and health.
27
Management was required to respond to these proposals within two weeks of
receipt and to outline how they would be implemented. 8 Of the 200,000 proposals
submitted in 1986, about half were reportedly accepted and used. 29 The former
GDR credited the active role of workers and their trade unions for their success
24. FINAt REPORT TO THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, EPIDEMIOLOGIC STUDY OF
REPRODUCTIVE AND OTHER HEALTH EFFECTS AMONG WORKERS EMPLOYED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF
SEMICONDUCTORS V (1992). The study also peripherally examined related male infertility. Id. at 6,
80-84.
25. Id. at X, 373-91.
26. Id. at 393-96. See generally John Markoff, Miscarriage Risk for Chip Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1992, at A29. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing IBM study of female
microchip workers).
27. Horst Willim, Trade Unions and Occupational Safety in the German Democratic Republic,
126 INT'L LAB. REv. 329, 332 (May - June 1987). See infra notes 153-85 and accompanying text
(discussing international comparisons).
28. Willim, supra note 27, at 332.
29. Id. at 333.
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in improving occupational safety and health.30 Economists estimated that ten to
fifteen percent of total investment funds were used for workplace safety and
health."
A comparative analysis of the resources devoted to improving overall occu-
pational safety and health in other countries might provide a response to the
argument that implementing RHPs and SHCs is economically inefficient. The
cost of instituting and maintaining a proactive effort to improve health and safety
need not damage the international competitiveness of U.S. businesses. The benefits
of RHPs, assessed from both a concrete, balance-sheet approach and from a
broader perspective, indicate that the gains derived from RHPs should outweigh
the cost incurred. As businesses in the United States retool their plants to remain
competitive with other countries, an ideal opportunity exists to build in improved
health and safety.
2
One key to successful RHPs is the written distribution of the program's
purposes, policies, and structure.3 Employers display the seriousness of their
commitment to an RHP by putting this information in writing with the endorse-
ment of the highest level officer in the company. The importance of the RHP is
thus clearly reinforced; adherence to its requirements will appear to be rewarded,
but the gravity of nonconformance should be perceived as well. In addition, the
informational value of this written form of communication is underscored because
of its enduring nature. While a training session is valuable to capture the
employees' attention regarding RHP issues, their retention of this important
knowledge is unfortunately subject to the learning curve phenomenon. Maintain-
ing an explanatory publication helps to overcome such learning loss.
A written format has of course long been in use in unionized environments.
Collective bargaining agreements often refer to and provide guidance on health
and safety issues, including notice of the responsibilities of the parties and/or
reference to cooperative labor management safety and health programs.3 4 Histor-
ically, unions have served as a watchdog for employee safety. The lack of
bargaining power that individual employees experience in conjunction with their
employer is altered by the presence of a collective bargaining representative. A
union's strength shifts the ordinary power differential between employer and
employee by reducing the individual employee's fear of raising safety and health
30. Id. at 329-30.
31. Id. at 330.
32. See William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safety and Health in the
Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives That Influence Employer Decisions
to Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REv. 9, 49 (1989). In addition, the European
Community appears to be setting a high priority on worker safety and health via its Social Charter,
which is a solemn declaration, rather than law, yet the Charter's status has been strengthened by the
Maastricht Agreement, and the impact of this Charter has been deemed significant in many respects.
Terence P. Stewart & Delphine A. Abellard, Labor Laws and Social Policies in the European
Community After 1992, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 507, 542-43, 566-67 (1992).
33. In multilingual environments, translations should be made available to employees who are
not fluent in English. See generally Weinstock, supra note 3, at 38 (discussing danger where instructions
relating to the operation and maintenance of factory equipment were printed only in English while
Spanish was the first language of most employees).
34. See BNA Policy and Practice Series; Labor Relations, Collective Bargaining Agreements No.
1074, 70:651, 70:660 (1991). See generally, Maakestad & Helm, supra note 32, at 50 (safety and
health issues more central in collective bargaining agreements).
1993]
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issues. Thus the presence of a union often results in increased attention to these
issues.
But, with the well-documented decline in union membership, 5 will employers
voluntarily assume a more responsible role in this regard? If the immediate past
is any indication, businesses have not adopted appropriate programs and policies
for managing and reducing reproductive harms. Perhaps blinded by concern for
their bottom line, businesses opted for sex-specific exclusionary policies that were
discriminatory and largely ineffectual rather than dealing with the full problem.16
Even though there appear to be numerous nonregulatory incentives that encourage
businesses to identify and reduce reproductive hazards in the workplace, this
pervasive and significant problem is far from solved. 7 Thus, the authors rec-
ommend that employers adopt RHPs as an immediate stride toward the goal of
reducing reproductive hazards in the workplace, even in the absence of a legislative
requirement. RHPs have much to recommend them. An RHP is designed to meet
the needs of each workplace and reacts to the unique needs of its stakeholders
through a cooperative framework. In addition, the SHC provides an on-site
mechanism that overcomes some of the inefficiencies for which OSHA's regulatory
enforcement scheme has been criticized.3"
The record speaks for itself; while a private resolution of the workplace
reproductive health problem may be desirable to employers, a public mandate is
necessary to gain universal implementation of RHPs. The interests of the many
vital stakeholders in this controversy, employers, employees and their unions,
and potential offspring are best served by the synergy created by invoking both
private and public remedial means. This will maximize human resources while
protecting workers of both genders, their offspring, and the environment from
reproductive hazards.
III. REPRODUCTIVE AND HEALTH PROGRAMS: THE PUBLIC
RESPONSE
Worker safety and health will continue to erode unless a clear commitment
exists to ameliorate these serious yet overlooked dangers. No significant and
meaningful improvement to worker safety and health will take place until three
35. Union Leaders Tie Recent Losses in Membership to Weak Economy, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 157, at A-8 (Aug. 13, 1992). Total union membership in the United States has declined to 16. 1%
of employed wage and salary workers based upon 1991 Bureau of Labor Statistics. But cf. Peter T.
Kilborn, Secretary Sees a Vital Role for Labor in U.S. Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at A13
(Secretary asserted when workers have voice, the yield is higher productivity).
36. See generally O'Brien & Reder, supra note 15, at 1153-59 (discussing fetal protection policies
as inadequate response to problem of workplace reproductive hazards).
37. See Maakestad & Helm, supra note 32, at 13 (discussing an analysis of incentives for
controlling overall workplace hazards outside the traditional mandate of legal requirements in which
the Office of Technology Assessment identified six factors that motivate business to improve their
programs for workplace health and safety (1) the employer's enlightened self-interest; (2) information
on workplace hazards and controls; (3) financial and tax incentives; (4) workers' compensation and
insurance; (5) tort liability; and (6) collective bargaining and individual rights). OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, PREVENTING ILLNESS AND INJURY IN THE WORKPLACE, SUMMARY 99TH CONG. 19 (April
1985) [hereinafter OTA ILLNESS AND INJURY REPORT].
38. See Maakestad & Helm, supra note 32, at 15 (noting that OSHA is ineffective because, inter
alia, its "regulations cannot be written with enough specificity for five million workplaces . . . [and]
... even a larger staff of good inspectors could not observe more than a small percentage of
workplaces").
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events occur. Appropriate federal legislation must be passed; agencies must
coherently formulate policies and guidance in an effort to enforce these legislative
mandates; and to a lesser extent, the judicial system must interpret these laws in
a manner which encourages compliance and promotes effective workplace safety
and health practices. For there to be optimal worker safety and health, in essence,
there must be leadership, incentives, and enforcement.
Private employer-sponsored programs discussed previously are the most ideal
form of protection for worker safety and health, but such programs regrettably
are not the norm. Of the estimated 3,500,000 private workplaces,
39 just seventy-
one have chosen to participate in OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program which
requires employers to implement comprehensive safety and health practices.
4
0 The
problem is obvious and it is large. Safety and health concerns along with
reproductive diseases impact, our society in profound ways and must be addressed
in both the public and private sector. The Centers for Disease Control's Occu-
pational Injury Panel concluded that "occupational injury is a public health crisis
that demands immediate attention.
' 4
1
The following section discusses federal legislation first, followed by a dis-
cussion of agency and then judicial responses to the issues raised in protecting
worker safety and health. Particular emphasis is placed on the challenge of
environmental chemicals that are or may be, reproductive and developmental
toxicants.
A. Legislation: Federal Initiatives
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) represents
Congress's first and most comprehensive effort to address workplace safety and
health issues. 42 Other legislation, as well, addresses these workplace issues to a
lesser extent. These are: the Toxic Substances Control Act,
43 Hazardous Subst-
ances Act," Clean Air Act, 4 Consumer Product Safety Act, 46 Solid Waste
39. S. REP. NP. 453, supra note 14, at 4.
40. COSHRA Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 195 (statement of Franklin Frazer, Director of
Education and Employment Issues, GAO). See also 54 Fed. Reg. 3904 (1989) (OSHA issued safety
and health program management guidelines for use by employers to prevent occupational injuries
and illnesses). There are, of course, many employers that have incorporated some safety and health
practices.
41. See S. REP. No. 435, supra note 14, at 4 & n.15. The Panel comprised of "health
professionals, federal officials, and representatives from management and labor." Id. at 4.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. 1992). The act is meant "to provide for the general
welfare, to assure so far as possible every working man and woman safe and healthful working
conditions." Id. at § 651(b).
The workplace environments relevant to chemical exposure include air, water, consumer and
office products and other work machinery, and toxics including pesticides.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1988 & Supp. 1992). This act states that chemical manufacturers and
processers "should" have the responsibility to develop "adequate data" with "respect to the effect
of chemical substances and mixtures on health and the environment." Id. at §2601(b)(1).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-77 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (prohibiting the use of misbranded or branded
hazardous substances).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (protecting and enhancing the quality of air
and conducting studies on inter alia, toxicological, teratogenic, and mutagenic effects of air pollutants).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-84 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (protecting public against unreasonable risks of
injury including illness, associated with consumer products).
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Disposal Act, 47 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA).
4
1
How Congress has historically addressed reproductive and developmental
toxicants, and what is necessary to properly address this issue follows. Generally,
Congress has made somewhat of an effort to provide for some protection from
adverse reproductive and developmental effects. Even though it has not declared
any overriding goal to this effect, same protection is available through piecemeal
legislative enactments. In a General Accounting Office Report to the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, it found that of the twelve pertinent legislative
enactments, just five of these acts mention a consideration for reproductive and
developmental health .49 It is no wonder, then, that the various agencies which
administer these laws have shown a pattern of indifference and neglect of
reproductive and developmental hazards. Thus, Congress must specifically assign
responsibility to agencies to generate and consider such safety and health data,
and then to incorporate it when making regulatory decisions. Our collective
increased awareness of how toxins destroy environments - workplace, global and
human - demands a more comprehensive response from the legislative branch.
Instead of allowing such an important issue as reproductive and developmental
toxicants to be included in legislation by happenstance, it should automatically
be written into the "Congressional statement of findings and declaration of
purpose and policy" of every law affecting exposure to chemicals. It is interesting
to note at this point that reproductive and developmental toxicity is not mentioned
once in the OSH Act. 50
Enacted twenty-three years ago, the OSH Act represented Congress's first
attempt at regulating workplace health and safety, stating that "[e]ach employer
... shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees .... ,,s' OSHA's authority
extends to nearly all private employers. OSHA is supposed to issue standards
and guidelines, conduct inspections, provide training, education, and consulting
services. It places primary responsibility for safety and health with employers .
2
The OSH Act has not, however, fulfilled its mission, and to some extent it
is a mission that needs re-evaluation. 3 In a sense, the OSH Act legislation is
only as effective as the OSHA agency that administers it. While many features
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (regulating the treatment, storage, transportation
and disposal of hazardous wastes).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-60 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (providing for liability, compensation, clean-up,
and emergency response of hazardous substances released into the environment and includes chemicals
associated with teratogenic and mutagenic effects).
49. See GAO REPRODUCTrVE HAZARD REPORT, supra note 11, at app. V, 94-104. The GAO
further found that those agencies administering laws specifically mentioning reproductive health were
no more likely to assess appropriate data when making regulations. Id. at 51.
50. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. 1992). See generally GAO REPRODUCTIvE HEALTH
REPORT, supra note II, at app. V, 102.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1988 &.Supp. 1992).
52. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. 1992). See generally Government Regulation of
Reproductive Hazards: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
105-13 (1991) (statement of Cynthia Douglass, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor).
53. See generally COSHRA Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1-2 (statement of Senator Kennedy,
Committee on Labor and Human Resources).
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of the OSH Act are commendable, its potential was never realized because as
one expert has noted, "OSHA has stumbled throughout most of its history from
program to inconsistent program . . . 54
In response to the shortcomings in both the OSH Act and OSHA, both the
Senate and the House of Representatives have sponsored bills to amend the OSH
Act. Both are known as the "Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health
Reform Act" (COSHRA). The Senate bill will be discussed herein, with attention
to how it affects reproductive and developmental toxicants."
Divided into twelve titles, the present COSHRA bill has a number of goals.
The most controversial of these is the mandatory creation of safety and health
programs, and the establishment of safety and health committees composed of
employers and employees. 6 Each employer, regardless of size, or the nature of
the business would be required to establish a written program, and the bill further
lists nine requirements.57 Criticized repeatedly as costly "straightjacket,"" s and as
"one-size-fits-all" 9 approaches, these measures represent an ambitious attempt
to address issues that for too long have been neglected. It is, of course, natural
for employers to reject further regulation and its costs as eroding global com-
petitiveness, wages, productivity and prices.6 However, there are potential off-
54. See COSHRA Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 115 (statement of Sidney A. Shapiro,
Professor, Univ. of Kansas Law School). Agency administration is, of course, very politically sensitive
and as changeable as the Executive Branch.
55. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§101-1301 (1991) (sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy,
Chairman, Comm. on Labor and Human Resources); H.R. 3160, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991)
(sponsored by Representative William Ford, Chairman, Comm. on Educ. and Labor). See COSHRA
Senate Hearings, supra note 3; S. REP. NO. 453, supra note 14; cf. Clinton's Mandate For Change
Likely to Mean New Aproaches to Old Safety and Health Issues, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at
C-I (Jan. 14, 1993) (U.S. Chamber of Commerce is drafting its own legislation in consultation with
employer organizations).
56. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-201 (1991). The Safety and Health Committee
requirement is applicable only to employers of eleven or more employees. Id. at § 201. Professor
Clyde Summers approves of COSHRA's mandatory election of employee safety representatives,
finding such health and safety committees "especially appropriate for implementing OSHA, for
unsafe or unhealthy conditions endanger all employees, even if only random individuals suffer actual
injury." Summers, supra note 20, at 543. Professor Summers also recommends using workplace
committees for advising employees regarding workers' compensation claims. Id.
57. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1991). See generally Steve Early, Committees Key to
OSHA Reform, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23, 1993, at 40.
58. See S. REP. No. 453, supra note 14, at 129 (minority views of Senators Hatch, Thurmond,
Kassebaum, Coats, and Cochran).
59. See S. REP. No. 453, supra note 14, at 122 (additional views of Senator Durenberger)
Compare OSHA Reform:. Fulfilling the Promise of a Safe and Healthy Workplace: Hearing on S.
1622 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1992)
(statement of Gerald F. Scannell, Vice President, Corporate Safety Affairs, Johnson & Johnson,
faulting the Safety and Health Programs and Committees as too rigid a prescription) and id. at 5
(statement of Horace A. Thompson III, on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers
opposing the particular requirement of Programs and Committees) with id. at 1 (statement of Grover
A. Vos, Director of Safety, Environmental Health and Assessment Programs, Occidental Petroleum
Corp. discussing its mandatory programs) and id. at 8 (statement of Howard Frumkin, M.D.,
M.P.H., Director of Emory Univ. Division of Environmental and Occupational Health that provisions
of COSHRA "will markedly improve workplace safety and health").
60. S. REP. No. 453, supra note 14, at 129-30 (referring to the report of Dr. James S. Holt,
Senior Economist, Employment Policy Foundation and Thomas M. Bruening computing the projected
costs of the present COSHRA bill to be $51 billion, sixty percent of that attributable to safety and
health programs and committees); cf. Clinton Should Convene Work Group to Draft New OSHA
Legislation, Kinney Tells NAM Meeting, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 232, at A-4 (Dec. 2, 1992)
(National Safe Workplace Institute asserted COSHRA bill product of an exclusive process which
needs to be opened up).
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setting benefits to this legislation. It is highly probable that workers' compensation
premiums would decrease, as would health insurance premiums, sick days, the
length of hospitalization and illnesses. Many employers are simultaneously com-
plaining of workers' compensation and health care costs, while criticizing the
COSHRA bill that shows promise of helping cure just those ills.
The value of the present COSHRA bill on safety and health programs and
committees is undeniable. This is so even for workplaces that are seemingly free
from chemicals, because no workplace is. One of the main values of the COSHRA
bill is to simply increase awareness of the pervasive existence of chemicals in
work environments, and to attempt to act on this at the actual workplaces instead
of through the issuance of rules from Washington, D.C. The authors endorse
the provisions relating to both Safety and Health Programs, as well as Commit-
tees.
The present COSHRA bill section on setting standards is more problematic,
however. 61 Section 408 of the bill would set a timetable for final standards on
eighteen specific workplace exposures, many of which negatively affect repro-
ductive and developmental outcomes. 62 Stronger still, section 407 is entirely
devoted to setting a final standard for ergonomic hazards. 6 How the Senate
arrived at this exclusive list is not clear. While the intentions are to improve
safety and health, this goal must be pursued with a cogent and systematic plan.
Legislators have again neglected to include a general principle for consideration
of reproductive and developmental hazards in amending the OSH Act. This is
not to overlook the importance of regulating the hazards just mentioned in this
section of the COSHRA bill. However, any such specific setting of standards
should be done in conjunction with research so that standards would be set for
the most common and severe work-related injuries and illnesses first, and then
other standards would be set in order of decreasing occurrence and severity. Such
a policy, providing for linkage between promulgation of standards and the degree
of risk, is a more rational approach to the abatement and control of environmental
and other hazards in the workplace. To develop such a system based upon priority
requires the co-operation of the Bureau of Labor Statistics - to report on injuries
and classify them; the Office of Technology Assessment - to develop such lists;
and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) - to
conduct research into environmental hazards in conjunction with private employ-
ers. As among the top ten work-related injuries, reproductive impairment is an
issue that has not been adequately addressed by the present COSHRA bill.
Related to this linkage model is a section of the present COSHRA bill on
Record Keeping and Reporting.Y The bill expands on the illness and injury data
61. See S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 401-09 (1991). These sections would be an enormous
challenge for OSHA, and setting these standards under such deadlines would be unattainable unless
the agency was infused with personnel and a larger budget.
62. See id. at § 408. Final standards are anticipated for logging operations; face, head, eye, foot
protection, walking and working surfaces; motor vehicle inspection, maintenance, safety; cadmium;
confined space entry; asbestos; hazardous waste operations training; scaffolds; fall protection;
permissible exposure limits updates for construction, maritime, agriculture; electric power generator;
methylene chloride; respiratory protection; butadiene; glycol ethers; indoor air quality; and long-
shoring.
63. Id. at § 407.
64. Id. at §§ 801-03. But cf. US Underestimated Injury-Linked Missed Workdays, BOSTON GLOBE,
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to be gathered by employers, but often an injury or illness is not found because
no one is looking for it. For example, IBM recently reported on the results of a
study of miscarriage rates for female microchip workers. 65 It found that there
was an elevated risk of miscarriage for such workers.6 But what IBM neglected
to study, and therefore has no data on, is the miscarriage rate for spouses of
male microchip workers. 67 Such a problem will never be discovered unless it is
included in the research from the start. Record keeping and reporting requirements
must be structured in such a fashion to avoid gender-stereotyping and other
biases regarding such characteristics as race or age.
A further question on record keeping and reporting requirements relates to
the magnitude of the negative outcome being reported. Serious injuries and death
are well covered in these requirements. However, subtle or latent injuries, illnesses
and diseases are valid endpoints to study; but employers or employees tend to
overlook them as not work-related. This is especially true with negative repro-
ductive and developmental outcomes such as menstrual irregularity, sexual or
reproductive dysfunction, miscarriages, birth defects or sterility. These are espe-
cially private issues, often enveloped in pain, and are not as likely to be reported
as other injuries, illnesses or diseases, but which are just as likely to be work-
related.
The last section in the present COSHRA bill to be addressed relates to
NIOSH and is found in sections 901-905. Under these sections, NIOSH would
be given full agency status within the Department of Health and Human Services
rather than within the Department of Labor.6 In the section, known as "Safety
Research," NIOSH would be charged with identifying "[m]ajor factors contrib-
uting to occupational injuries and deaths through accident investigations and
epidemiological research.''69 The drafters of this bill left the word "health" out
of this section title. While health issues often are not as apparent as safety issues,
they are as important and deserving of attention. Also, the drafters limited the
type of research generated to epidemiological research, 70 to the exclusion of
experimental research, including data derived from animal and laboratory exper-
imentation. Epidemiological studies, which evaluate the "distribution and deter-
minants of health and disease in human populations ... provide some of the
best information available to assess human ...risk.' '7 Such data, though, is
"often unavailable." ' 72 Employers, and health care providers, therefore, must use
Feb. 1, 1993, at 20 (study contends actual number of missed workdays five to nine times higher than
is currently being reported).
65. See John Markoff, Miscarriages Tied To Chip Factories, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1992, at Al
(IBM commissioned study by Johns Hopkins University).
66. Id. The article also discusses other studies in this area. Id. at D3.
67. The study's limited scope is a start, but a biased one. It was reported that subsequently IBM
issued warnings to its workers and other companies. Id. at Al. This echoes back to the era of FPPs
where companies relied upon selected science both to externalize real costs of their operations and
to exclude women from such jobs. See generally O'Brien & Reder, supra note 15, at 1153-59.
68. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 905 (1991). There is no apparent rationale for aligning
NIOSH with HHS, and this proposal seems to only dissipate strength from the Department of Labor
and OSHA specifically.
69. Id. at § 902.
70. Id.
71. See REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 40. Designing a sound
epidemiological study is, however, a difficult task. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 12.
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their best judgment based upon nonepidemiological data. To limit research
NIOSH conducts and relies upon only human studies as this bill unduly prejudices
the reporting and resolution of subtle, latent illnesses, injuries, and diseases for
which no substantial human data yet exists, such as reproductive and develop-
mental hazards.
The National Surveillance Program in the present COSHRA bill appears to
be a very comprehensive and expensive approach to record keeping and reporting
which was discussed previously. If the Bureau of Labor Statistics correctly receives
information on occupational illnesses, deaths and serious injuries, and then
properly classifies such data, then it would be redundant for NIOSH to do the
same. Moreover, state labor and workers' compensation agencies collect such
data. To create a new program is an ill-advised attempt at collecting data; it
would be much more productive to focus on the correct and accurate compilation
of data. It is, moreover, important that the most complete questions be asked
initially so that the data is accurate. For example, if a question or study had as
its endpoint for outcomes fetal death, then it would be missing other equally
critical though not so obvious endpoints, such as impaired fertility, impotence,
timing of fetal death, congenital malformations, chromosomal abnormalities, etc.
Reproductive and developmental hazards are manifest in wide-ranging, subtle,
yet little-studied ways.
The present COSHRA bill, discussed partially above as it relates to repro-
ductive and developmental hazards, is generally a solid attempt at improving
workplace safety and health. However, there are other legislative incentives that
could be used that would complement this bill. First, a user tax could be passed
for manufacturers, buyers, and sellers of the many thousands of chemicals in
commercial use.73 This money could be earmarked for much needed research in
the area of occupational exposure to these chemicals. Research ideally would be
conducted by both private employers and trade groups with agency supervision
and oversight. Second, part of this tax to fund research might also be used to
pursue both new product and alternative product development. For example,
where there is no disincentive to the manufacturer of lead-based batteries, lead
will continue to be used. If, however, new or alternative technologies are
developed, this may be an incentive needed to eradicate lead from the workplace.
If there is insufficient support for a direct tax, Congress could consider incentives
in the form of tax deductions or tax credits for such research and product
development. The present COSHRA bill is an important, but partial solution to
the problem of worker safety and health. Tax legislation in the form of user
taxes, deductions, or credits, should be considered as a means of reducing the
enormous costs of the COSHRA bill, and as a strategy to more completely
research and reduce reproductive and developmental hazards.
B. Agency-Action: Oversight of Reproductive and Developmental Toxicants
Public implementation of RHPs would be virtually impossible without agency
leadership and facilitation. With their ability to quickly issue standards and
73. See Maakestad & Helm, supra note 32, at 16 & n.31; See also OTA ILLtESS AND INJURY
REPORT, supra note 37, at 20.
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enforcement capability through penalties, agency action would seem to be the
fool-proof incentive towards creating safer and healthier workplaces. This has
not proven to be the case, however.
The federal regulatory agencies with primary responsibility over exposures
to environmental chemicals are OSHA, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC).7 4 The domains relevant to exposures are air, water,
food, toxics, consumer products, and the workplace which includes the previous
five domains. 7 The extent and sufficiency of federal regulation of exposure to
environmental chemicals that cause adverse reproductive and developmental out-
comes "is uncertain at best." ' 76 Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the Committee
on Governmental Affairs, who requested the GAO Report, reiterated the conclu-
sion that the pattern of regulatory gaps and the lack of rigor in risk assessment
decisions leaves little doubt that the public is insufficiently protected against
reproductive and developmental toxicants.
77
Of the 104,000 substances listed in the NIOSH Registry of Toxic Effects of
Chemical Substances, there is reproductive toxicity data for only five percent of
these.78 Clearly there is a dearth of information on reproductive and developmental
toxicity. 79 But this does not relieve agencies of their responsibility. Even among
the agencies which are charged with, inter alia, protecting reproductive health,
"there was no greater likelihood of ... basing their regulations on these dis-
eases . . . ." The GAO Report further found the "[offices reported examining
reproductive and developmental data only 44 percent of the time when they made
the 138 major regulatory decisions. This falls short of our expectations and the
agencies own policies, which call for looking at all relevant disease endpoints." 81
The focus of our remaining discussion on the role of agencies in implementing
RHPs will be on OSHA. Although it is charged with providing a safe and
healthful workplace for every man and woman, OSHA promulgated only seven
standards regarding reproductive hazards out of twenty-one standards issued
during the period covered by the GAO Report.8 2
74. GAO REPRODUCTIVE HAzARD REPORT, supra note 11, at 14.
75. Id. at 3 n.I.
76. Id. at 3. See generally, COSHRA Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 (testimony of Cynthia
Douglass, Deputy Ass't Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health agreeing with GAO
assessment). But cf. id. at 14 (testimony of Eric C. Peterson, Executive Director, CPSC disagreeing
with GAO report stating that reproductive and developmental hazards are always evaluated); id. at
18 (testimony of Linda J. Fisher, Ass't Administrator, EPA criticizing the GAO report as a "poor
basis on which to evaluate EPA's efforts"); id. at 20 (testimony of Fred R. Shank, Director, Center
for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA, concluding that contrary to the GAO Report, the
FDA's program protects against reproductive and developmental toxicants).
77. See generally COSHRA Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (opening statement of Senator
Glenn).
78. See Federal Government Efforts to Protect Public, Worker Health Criticized at Hearing, 19
0. S. & H. Rep. 524 (BNA) (Current Rep.) (Oct. 9, 1991) (statement of Lynn R. Goldman, Acting
Chief of California Dep't of Health Services' Office of Environmental and Occupational Epidemi-
ology). Ms. Goldman further noted that even when such data is available, it is rarely considered. Id.
79. See GAO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH REPORT, supra note 11, at 14 (reporting that the field of
reproductive and developmental toxicology is just forty years old, and as such, test information is
not readily available).
80. Id. at 55.
81. Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 57.
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It becomes apparent, then, that OSHA's mission has historically been a self-
guided exercise operating in relative independence from the legislation which
created it. The mission has, of course, become politicized to an extent due to
changes in Presidential administrations and priorities."s With OSHA's record of
regulatory decision making regarding reproductive and developmental toxicants,
it is clear that the agency has its own interpretation of enforcement under the
OSH Act. One scholar has recently written "[b]ecause enforcement is so com-
pletely controlled by the agency, employees' rights and remedies depend heavily
on the effectiveness of OSHA's enforcement - its resources, its aggressiveness in
correcting violations, and its willingness to impose penalties to deter willful and
persistent violations. OSHA's protection ... is flawed both in structure and
administration."
8 4
A prime example of what may go awry due to the politization of the
regulatory process, and how an agency might stray from its mission follows
herein. OSHA, as required by Presidential order, circulated proposed rules on
air contaminants standards in 1992 to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). s5 The OMB's Acting Administrator suspended review of OSHA's draft
pending OSHA's analysis of how the regulatory cost of' such health and safety
rules would impact workers' health since OMB assumed wages would be cut to
pay for the rules.8 6 In other words, OMB asserted in a risk-risk analysis that the
rules could be so expensive that companies would be forced to cut wages and
jobs, and therefore make workers' health worse.87 Senator Edward M. Kennedy
(D. Mass.), Chairman of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, noted
that, "O.M.B. should stop kowtowing to business, and the Labor Department
should get on with its statutory responsibility of issuing these important health
standards." 88 Easier said than done. This may change, though, during the Clinton
Administration. 89
What OSHA currently faces are the challenges of enforcing its current
legislative mandate and regulatory agenda, as well as the prospect of passage of
a reform bill. 90 If the present reform bill fails to pass, the current law will remain
83. See Martin Tolchin, Reich Charts a Path to Return the Labor Dept. to Center Stage, N.Y.
Timms, Jan. 8, 1993, at A12.
84. Summers, supra note 20, at 504. Prof. Summers attributes a great deal of this to lack of
inspections and an unwillingness to exact appropriately-sized fines. Id. at 507-08.
85. See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Citing Cost, Budget Office Blocks Workplace Health Proposal,
N.Y. Timms, Mar. 16, 1992, at A13.
86. Letter from James B. MacRae, Jr., Acting Administrator, OMB, to Nancy Risque-Rohrbach,
Ass't Sec'y for Policy, Dep't of Labor (Mar. 10, 1992).
87. See Hershey, supra note 85, at A-13. See generally Robert E. Sheriff, OMB And Risk-Risk
Analysis, OccUPATIONAL HAZARDs, May 1992, at 138 (American Industrial Hygiene Association
President critized OMB actions).
88. Hershey, supra note 85, at A-13. After working out a compromise, the OMB agreed to lift
the suspension. See Bruce D. Butterfield, OMB agrees to lift suspension on workers' health proposal,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 25, 1992, at 35.
89. See Steven Greenhouse, Clinton's Choice of Reich Hints at a Stepped-Up Role for Labor
Department, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 12, 1992, at 10. See generally Daily Lab. Rep. No. 9, supra note 55
(citing Secretary Reich's pledge to improve worker safety and health protection and his approval of
COSHRA as a "step in the right direction." Secretary Reich also stated that the safety and health
committee proposal "intrigues" him).
90. There are obstacles here, as well. For example, OSHA proposed sharp reductions in
permissible exposure limits for glycol ethers. For the first time, then, a chemical would be regulated
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in place. In this scenario, it is imperative that OSHA more seriously consider
and act upon the threat from environmental hazards, particularly reproductive
and developmental toxicants. Standard-setting, leadership in research, and rig-
orous enforcement procedures, along with inspections as they are possible, may
be pursued with much more success, even under the present act, if the commitment
exists from OSHA administrators.
Also in place at OSHA is a Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) which
represents a "distillation of applied safety and health management practices ...
strongly endorsed by individuals, corporations, professional associations, and
labor representatives." 91 Begun in 1982, OSHA's approach has been to focus on
'sound management practices' in the operation of safety and health programs,
instead of a model encompassing more input from workers. 92 In fact, there is no
reference to meaningful employee participation. OSHA's policy is that employers
have responsibility for decision making, but that employees be "included in the
process on decision making on matters which affect their health and safety.' ' g
It is a wonder why even these "management guidelines" lacking any employee
involvement are voluntary rather than mandatory. This is so in spite of OSHA's
own statement that there exists "a strong correlation between the application of
sound management practices in the operation of safety and health programs and
a low incidence of injuries and illnesses .... VPP worksites generally have lost-
workday case rates that range from one-fifth to one-third the rates experienced
by average worksites.' ' OSHA's alignment with employer interests in this
capacity has clearly skewed the agency's judgment. By assuming that the regu-
latory process requires choosing between business and labor interests, rather than
viewing the varied interests as shared and complementary, OSHA has prioritized
interests furthering the adversarial nature of business and labor concerns. In
OSHA's words, more attention to safety and health issues led to reduced costs,
yet OSHA has refused to institutionalize a safety and health program even when
it is demonstrated that both business and labor interests are served.
It is no surprise that OSHA has been less than enthusiastic about the present
OSHA reform bill. 9 The bill's many features propose to radically alter the
primarily for reproductive hazards. See Clinton Administration Orders Pullback of More Than 50
Last-Minute Regulations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at A-13 (Jan. 25, 1993). These regulations,
holdovers from the time of the Bush Administration, are now on hold pending review. Id. Also, a
federal appeals court recently struck down an OSHA regulation which attempted to set generic
standards for many chemicals. See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (1 1th Cir. 1992); U.S. Declines
to Appeal Voiding of OSHA Air Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 24, 1993, at 10; Michael deCourcy
Hinds, Judge Deals OSHA Setback on Repetitive Stress Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1993, at 7
(OSHA fine invalidated since agency lacked standard on repetitive stress); see also Marshall J. Breger,
Recent Developments in OSHA Litigation, 43 Lab. L.J. (No. 11) 687 (1992).
91. 54 Fed. Reg. 3904, 3909 (1989) (issuance of voluntary guidelines for safety and health
management). The authors view even the name, VPP, as problematic, harking back to FPPs and
notions of how employers are "protecting" employees rather than the parties working together to
effect improvements.
92. See id. at 3904, 3906. See also Julie E. Korostoff et al., Comment, Rethinking the OSHA
Approach to Workplace Safety: A Look at Worker Participation in the Enforcement of Safety
Regulations in Sweden, France, and Great Britain, 13 Comp. LAB. L.J. 45, 47-48 (1991).
93. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3904, 3907 (1989).
94. Id. at 3904.
95. See OSHA Said to be Seeking Information As Step Toward Possible Rule For Job Safety
Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 237, at A-8 (Dec. 9, 1992) (OSHA offered "qualified"
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centralized, entrenched agency by changing its nature and functions. The agency
currently formulates policy, guidelines and standards from its central office and
promulgates these to the millions of worksites throughout the nation. The current
reform bill, however, through the creation of individual worksite safety and
health programs as well as committees, decentralizes the core of decision-making
power and places it within the worksite. Under this scheme, employers and
employees assume a significant amount of responsibility for workplace safety and
health. This would presumably lessen OSHA's overall influence. OSHA's func-
tions, under this bill, change in form as well as in substance.
OSHA's current model for enforcing the OSH Act has for the most part
become discredited.9 The goals of the OSH Act are unattainable through its
present policies of standard-setting, inspections, and insignificant civil fines.
Achieving the ends of workplace safety and health for all requires the commitment
of employers and employees to actively and cooperatively identify all workplace
hazards and abate them. It would behoove OSHA, the principal agency for
workplace health and safety, to demonstrate a more genuine commitment for
safer and healthier workplaces, instead of following the winds of partisan politics.
OSHA's role, following the passage of such legislation as the current reform
bill, would be changed yet not diminished. For example, OSHA is clearly unable
to meaningfully inspect or visit each worksite on a regular basis anyway. Instead
of continuing with such an inefficient practice, under the reform bill scenario,
OSHA could receive reports from each program and committee, and conduct
audits of their completeness and efficacy. Moreover, OSHA could still be re-
sponsible for identifying hazards and setting exposure and use limits for them.
To a limited extent, OSHA has done this in the past. A particularly vivid example
of how an agency regulation can lead to both a safer workplace and lower costs
exists with the ethylene oxide standard. The 1984 OSHA regulation reducing
employee exposure had the unforeseen consequence of creating a market incentive
for manufacturers to develop new technology which was less expensive than the
old technology and cost half as much as OSHA predicted. 97 OSHA could also
develop a more integrated relationship with NIOSH by better positioning itself
to disseminate NIOSH research and studies to worksites. This would further
foster a cooperative relationship between the agency and businesses. OSHA ought
not to feel threatened by a change in its job description if reform legislation
passes. Rather it should be viewed as a challenge for the future, one that could
repair the agency's image as well as its efficiency. Even if reform legislation
fails, OSHA still has not even met the goals of the present OSH Act, and as is
apparent, there is quite a bit of room for improvement.
support of safety and health programs); Democrats' Proposed Job Safety Bill Should Include Funding
House Panel Told, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 158, at A-8 (Aug. 14, 1992) (Acting OSHA head
opposed for the third time the present COSHRA bill).
96. See Marsha Katz, Criminal Liability For Health and Safety: Executives at Risk, 43 LAB.
L.J.(No.10) 679, 680 (1992); see also Joleane Dutzman, Note, State Criminal Prosecutions: Putting
Teeth in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 12 Gao. MASON U.L. REV. 737 (1990).
97. See OSHA 's Ethylene Oxide Rule Reduced Exposures, Spurred Development of Technology,
Study Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 143, at A-3 (July 24, 1992); see also 49 Fed. Reg. 25,734
(1984).
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IV. RECOVERY FOR INJURIES FROM WORK-RELATED EXPOSURE
TO TOXIC SUBSTANCES: REPRODUCTIVE AND HEALTH PROGRAMS
MUST STILL RESPOND
Environmental exposures at the workplace through chemicals, processes and
products will continue at low levels even if highly protective reform legislation
passes and agencies enforce such laws. Employers and employees are still left to
struggle with the issue of injuries to those at the workplace as well as their
spouses and potential offspring due to workplace hazards. Since OSHA currently
has only regulatory authority and is not empowered to compensate victims for
OSH Act violations, the injured parties must generally pursue claims through
state workers' compensation systems designed as no-fault insurance programs to
compensate workers injured during the course of employment. 9 Alternatively,
injured victims may be able to pursue a private civil action in tort if they are
not pre-empted from doing so by the workers' compensation statute. 99 Finally, a
criminal prosecution by the state may lie pursuant to the states' general police
powers to protect public safety and welfare. These cases are tried to the extent
the injuries are so severe or the recklessness so extreme as to warrant criminal
punishment. A brief discussion of each follows as it relates to recovery for work-
related injuries - particularly due to the presence of reproductive and develop-
mental toxicants in the workplace.
A. Workers' Compensation
By 1949, every state had adopted a workers' compensation system.1' ° The
purpose of the law is to compensate workers injured during the course of their
employment with a timely award, regardless of employer fault.' 0' Goals of
workers' compensation include deterrence of accidents and the promotion of
safety, yet these are unattainable under the current system, especially with respect
to reproductive and developmental toxicants.1 02
Historically, workers' compensation statutes refused coverage for workers
who contracted occupational diseases. 03 Eventually coverage expanded to include
occupational diseases as compensable injuries. However, proof is still problematic,
even as occupational diseases "have replaced accidents as the main cause of
injuries in the workplace."' 0 4 Claimants are required to prove that occupational
exposure triggered their disease. 03 Yet this is especially difficult for reproductive
and developmental diseases because there exists an inherent background risk for
such injury in the whole population. This dual causation problem is exacerbated
by the current lack of understanding in the etiology of many reproductive and
98. See Eggen, supra note 7, at 859-60.
99. See id. at 867-68; see also Maakestad & Helm, supra note 32, at 29.
100. See Maakestad & Helm, supra note 32, at 18 n.42.
101. See Eggen, supra note 7, at 860.
102. See id.
103. See Ellen R. Peirce & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Workers' Compensation and Occupational
Disease: A Return to Original Intent, 67 OR. L. REv. 649, 655-59 (1988). The system was biased in
favor of awarding remuneration only for those suffering accidental injuries. See Eggen, supra note
7, at 859-60.
104. Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 103, at 687.
105. See id. at 661-62.
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developmental diseases. Furthermore, many such diseases have a long latency
period (such as the drug DES which did not manifest its harm until the next
generation) and proof of workplace exposure as the primary cause becomes nearly
impossible. Lastly, as discussed above, there is a lack of urgency in addressing
this problem. "At least 80 percent of the 48,000 chemical substances in industrial
use have no toxicity information available."'0 It becomes clear how difficult a
claimant's burden of proof is.
Even if the claimant prevails, recovery is limited to economic loss and
disability.'07 Occupational diseases can occur under such a system, and not even
be compensable. A case of infertility caused by a toxic work environment may
result in no disability under current workers' compensation laws because the
worker is still able to perform the functions of the job. Since payments are for
the most part based on disability, the worker may be denied compensation for
all of the losses due to this reproductive injury. 08 Workers' compensation is also
limited in who it covers. Only the worker may proceed with a claim, even though,
because of a reproductive or developmental disease, the injury is to a spouse
and/or their offspring.'09 These injured third parties have no recourse under
workers' compensation statutes even though their injuries occurred as a result of
the worker's exposure.
This no-fault compensation system for workplace injuries as yet offers no
significant incentives for employers to reduce toxic exposures. Under a no-fault
system, employers avoid responsibility and instead offer payments. The payments,
although timely, often are paltry and do not realistically reflect the true cost of
the injury, especially those involving reproductive and developmental hazards." 0
When workers' compensation reform translates into benefit cuts and coverage
restrictions, whereby workers receive on average sixty percent of their weekly
wage, major changes are in order."'
First, all insurers could better track worksites that have higher than average
workers' compensation claims and analyze them by class of injury, including
negative reproductive and developmental health consequences. This information
could be used to identify high-risk job functions, and consequently insurers could
charge more in premiums to insure all these risks. Employers would thereby be
directly penalized in the form of a premium for engaging in high-risk job
functions. This would be a deterrent to some extent. Additionally, compensation
for such injuries might be indexed above that for payments arising out of so-
called typical injuries. Insurers might also consider more workplace inspections
and evaluations in an effort to reduce their own losses, as well as to prod
employers to reconsider their present processes.
Finally, the proof of case for occupational diseases must be reworked. It
has been suggested that since claimants have very limited access to information
regarding causation and work-relatedness, it might be more appropriate to realign
106. See Maakestad & Helm, supra note 32, at 27.
107. See Eggen, supra note 7, at 865. Under a tort-based recovery, relief is available additionally
in the form of damages for pain and suffering. Id.
108. See Eggen, supra note 7, at 865.
109. See id. at 863, 865.
110. See Kimberly Blanton, Plugging the Dike, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1993, at 35.
111. See id. at 35, 39.
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the parties' responsibilities and shift the burden to employers to demonstrate that
the illness is not work-related.12 And to the extent that the disease may be caused
by other hereditary, environmental, or risk factors, the claimant would then have
the burden of demonstrating what percentage of the disease is work-related." 3
Realigning the burdens of proof in workers' compensation claims addresses many
of the barriers claimants encounter in their proof of case. Such changes would,
moreover, force employers to develop research on workplace processes, and
would possibly act as an incentive for employers to seek safer alternative work
processes.
B. Tort Liability
A tort-based theory of liability for work-related injuries is as problematic as
a claimant's proof of case under workers' compensation. Moreover, under the
exclusivity doctrine, "workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for an
injured worker suffering from a covered, although not necessarily compensable,
occupational disease or injury.""14 If workers are able to demonstrate an exception
exists, they may seek civil liability in tort. Furthermore, spouses and offspring,
injured as a result of the worker's exposure may bring suit under this theory.
All victims, though, still face the hurdle of proving that the exposure directly
caused their injuries.
As discussed previously, proof of this causation is difficult given the nature
of reproductive and developmental injuries, and the current technological limits
of scientific inquiry. Traditional legal doctrine requires a level of certainty in
causation, and so is unsuited to analysis of many of the cases involving repro-
ductive and developmental injuries.
Although victims seeking redress in the tort system have a wider range of
recovery possibilities, including recovery for pain and suffering, they must first
prove causation. Consider a pre-natal injury to a fetus caused by the female
worker's exposure to lead in her job as a battery-maker. Consider also that the
woman may live in a rented apartment in which lead-based paint is starting to
chip off the walls. The later born child is found to be, perhaps, a few points
below average on an I.Q. test. Was this due to the mother's exposure at work,
or at home, or because of the lead the mother was exposed to when she was a
child? Would the child have had this score regardless of the lead exposure?
"Causal indeterminacy is a consistent characteristic of reproductive and genetic
injury claims, even where the claimants can demonstrate a general, or statistical,
probability of causation. Strict adherence to traditional notions of proof of
causation, therefore, would necessitate the dismissal of virtually all such claims.""' 5
112. See Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 103, at 681-83.
113. See id. at 681-83.
114. See Eggen, supra note 7, at 867-68; Maakestad & Helm, supra note 32, at 30 (exceptions
exist to the exclusivity rule if (1) disability not compensable under workers' compensation; (2) federal
law allows for dual recovery under workers' compensation and tort systems; (3) employer occupies
'dual capacity status'; or (4) employer committed intentional rather than negligent tort).
115. Eggen, supra note 7, at 889. See generally Dan L. Burk, When Scientific Norms are
Abandoned in the Courtroom, CHRoN. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 17, 1993, at BI (discussing difficulty in
ascertaining what constitutes legally admissible objective scientific evidence); Stephen Burd, High
Court to Rule on Peer Reviews of Scientific Evidence, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 17, 1993, at
A19 (discussing controversy regarding admissibility of different types of scientific testimony).
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Under the present system, unless it can be shown that exposure at work was the
proximate, direct cause of the injuries, all recovery is barred, even though the
exposure contributed in part to the injuries. Employers have no incentive to
address and prevent injuries under such a strict system of proof.
Alternative theories of liability must be explored with relation to cases
involving this class of torts. Plaintiffs have a nearly insurmountable task in
proving their case. The impossibility is apparent because many toxicants in use
have not yet even been studied by the scientific community. This lack of
knowledge in aspects of occupational medicine, especially as it relates to toxi-
cology, necessarily favors defendant/employers since the toxic tort case will rarely
be proven under such circumstances. The current limits of scientific inquiry work
against employees, spouses and offspring who have been injured because of toxic
work environments. Consequently, plaintiffs are undercompensated for injuries.
Moreover, there is no loss to defendants; and so their behavior is undeterred, if
not reinforced, under the current system.
For there to be a more equitable allocation of the risks associated with being




Moreover, it has also been suggested that it may be appropriate in such cases to
lower the standard of expertise required as to studies and scientific knowledge." 7
Epidemiological studies are ideal, but often unavailable. Until sounder studies
are available, covering all classes of reproductive and developmental toxicants, it
would be appropriate to compromise and allow into evidence studies of a less
certain, but still acceptable quality, such as statistical studies.
Employers will continue undeterred, with little incentive to respond to this
problem, until changes are imposed from Congress, agency action, or judicial
innovation. Courts have power, too, to encourage accountability for work-related
injuries.
C. Criminal Liability For Workplace Injuries
In recognition of the seriousness of injuries sustained while at work, an
increasing number of states recognize the criminal liability of corporations for
acts of their agents."" This is perhaps symptomatic of the extent to which current
laws and agency actions have been unable to generate and maintain a commitment
to workplace safety and health.
Criminal prosecution for workplace injuries and deaths gained momentum
in the 1980s when states began pursuing criminal law remedies to protect worker
safety and health. 19 The validity of these tactics was confirmed when a federal
appeals court ruled that federal safety and health laws do not pre-empt state
prosecutions. 2 0 The practical effect of this ruling is that employers may be held
to meet state safety and health laws as well as federal laws. Such criminal
116. For an excellent discussion on alternative theories of liability see Professor Eggen's article,
supra note 7, at 887-912. Professor Eggen calls for a new jurisprudence with regard to toxic
reproductive and genetic injuries in the workplace. Id.
117. Id. at 900-01.
118. See Katz, supra note 96, at 680-81; Maakestad & Helm, supra note 32, at 37-46.
119. See Katz, supra note 96, at 680-81.
120. Illinois v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
809 (1989).
[Vol. 19:97
Workplace Reproductive Health Programs
prosecutions have had mixed success, primarily attributable to the states' lack of
resources to devote to such cases, as well as to their burden of proving that the
employers foresaw, or knew the risk of danger, and that the employers possessed
mens rea, criminal intent.'
2'
Criminal prosecution of employers has received heightened attention in states,
and recently California passed such a bill. Under its state law, corporations or
managers will be found guilty if they possess actual knowledge of a serious
concealed danger and knowingly fail to inform authorities or warn employees.1 22
Reproductive and developmental hazards are clearly serious concealed dangers,
and such injuries would be recoverable under this law. The present COSHRA
reform bill seems to implicitly approve of these state efforts. In section 512, the
bill states that "[n]othing in this Act shall preclude State and local law enforce-
ment agencies from conducting criminal prosecutions .... "123 This rise in criminal
prosecutions cannot be seen as unanticipated where there is "an erosion of legal
barriers protecting corporations from criminal charges, increasing public concern
about industry's responsibility for employee health, and looser enforcement by
OSHA."'1
24
V. HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS: STATE INITIATIVES
It is instructive to compare the present COSHRA bill to several state efforts
to implement joint health and safety committees. For example, the state of
Oregon has provisions requiring employers to create safety committees 125 but
these appear to be remedial rather than preventative in nature and also do not
emphasize the deeper, long-range health issues, including the reproductive health
questions as discussed in this article.
Nonetheless, COSHRA was partly modeled after the Oregon occupational
safety and health program, according to John Pompei, Oregon's program director,
who testified before the House regarding the impact of the proposed COSHRA
bill on small businesses. 26 The Oregon rules took effect in March, 1991 and were
part of a workers' compensation reform bill enacted in 1990.127 Mr. Pompei
provided data indicating a decrease in lost workday rates that marked an
improvement after the 1989 reform bill. 12 Because of this decrease, employers
within the state saved more than $1 billion in costs. 129 While Oregon law previously
provided that the state Director of the Department of Insurance and Finance had
authority to require "public or private employers of 10 or more employes [sic]
to establish and administer a safety committee if the employer has a lost workday
121. See Katz, supra note 96, at 681-82; see also New York Appellate Court Overturns Convictions
in Pymm Thermometer Case, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 245, at A-7 (Dec. 21, 1992) (appellate
court ordered a new trial for the "controversial" workplace prosecution of business owners for their
role in the mercury poisoning of an employee).
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 387 (West Supp. 1993).
123. See S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 512 (1991).
124. Katz, supra note 96, at 682.
125. OR. REv. STAT. § 654.176 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
126. Daily Lab. Rep. No. 158, supra note 95, at A-8 (discussing H.R. 3160 version of COSHRA
bill).





cases incidence rate greater than the rate the director determines is consistent
with reasonable workplace health and safety .. ," 130 the amended statute specifies
that such safety committees shall be established and administered where "the
employer has a lost workday case incidence rate in the top 10 percent of all rates
for employers in the same industry; or (B) the workers' compensation premium
classification assigned to the greatest portion of the payroll for the employer has
a premium rate in the top 25 percent of premium rates . . ."I" These state
provisions contrast sharply with the proposed federal bill. The federal legislation
requires joint health and safety programs across the board and mandates SHCs
for all employers with eleven or more employees. The Oregon model, however,
requires safety and health programs only upon evidence of high rates of injuries
or illnesses.3 2 The Oregon statute ties the requirement of safety committees into
a high lost workday rate because it was part of a workers' compensation reform
bill. This is certainly no coincidence. The absence of a pro-active safety and
health program should logically lend itself to a higher rate of lost workdays. The
fact that employer funds can be saved by instituting SHPs may convince employers
that SHPs that incorporate RHPs represent one cure for what is a vast employer
crisis - cost containment of workers' compensation insurance.,
The proponents of the present federal OSHA reform bill should note that
this feature of a successful state statute might make sense on the federal level as
well. In other words, the resistance of the business community might be lessened
if the mandatory SHPs and SHCs for employers with eleven or more employees
were triggered by the poor safety and health record of a company. Additionally,
the ability of OSHA to monitor and enforce such a reform bill would be vastly
increased over the current COSHRA provisions precisely because only those
employers with poor records would be subject to the mandatory SHP/SHC
4
This also would provide an incentive for employers to independently improve
their SHPs, thereby avoiding mandatory oversight. Unfortunately, it might also
encourage some companies to underreport the incidence of accident/injuries or
lost workday rates.
It should also be noted that the Oregon committees are to be composed of
equal numbers of employees (who volunteer or are elected by peers) and employer
representatives. 3 5 This is similar to provisions in the present COSHRA bill.
3 6
Training and meeting time in Oregon committees is compensated at the employees'
130. OR. REV. STAT. § 654.176 (1989).
131. Id. at § 654.176(I)(b)(A)&(B) (1989 & Supp. 1992).
132. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1991) requires that each employer must have an SHP.
There is no threshold in the present COSHRA bill linking injuries to programs, although the Secretary
is supposed to track high injury and illness rates under S. 1622, § 801. Only employers with 11 or
more employees must have an SHC under the federal bill. S. 1622, § 201.
133. blanton, supra note 110, at 39.
134. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101, 201 (1991). It should be noted that Oregon increased
its joint safety staffing by 73 positions with enactment of its workers' compensation reform bill. See
Daily Lab. Rep. No. 158, supra note 95. Absent a vast increase in appropriations, OSHA could
hardly be effective in enforcing mandatory SHCs unless these were limited to the most egregious
situations.
135. OR. REv. STAT. § 654.182(l)(a) (1992).
136. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1991).
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regular hourly rate.137 The present COSHRA bill also provides for paid time for
committee activities.3 8 This is vital for worker participation. Management rep-
resentatives on these committees are generally paid for this time or it is considered
part of their job, and thus such a monetary investment in the work of all
committee members reflects the seriousness of the employer's commitment to
safety and health.
Finally, under the Oregon statute, employers in multi-employer groups may
satisfy the committee requirement via equivalent committees instituted pursuant
to collective bargaining agreements. 139 Additionally, a grant program funds edu-
cation and training in Oregon.'40 The present COSHRA bill provides for training
and grants in more detail than the Oregon statute.'
41
The State of Washington's Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act
(WISHA) provides that workplaces with eleven or more employees must designate
a safety and health committee with employer-selected and employee-elected rep-
resentatives.' 42 These committees review health inspection and accident investi-
gation reports and are responsible for illness/injury prevention programs.' 43
Washington state's information efforts in the area of workplace hazards affecting
reproductive health are comprehensive and commendable. The Hazard Commu-
nication Standards set out requirements for information and training in the
workplace and require that all employers ascertain chemical-related hazards.'"
Though not a legal requirement, the guidelines for employers recommend that
employees sign a form verifying that they have attended hazard communication
training. 4 The State of Washington's emphasis on reproductive health hazards
demonstrates to proponents of the federal COSHRA reform bill that specific
reference to reproductive health issues can and should be high on the list of
priorities. 146
One question that comes to mind when reviewing state safety and health
programs at a time when there exists a commitment to legislative reform on a
national level is whether states should continue to provide separate safety and
health programs. Under the present COSHRA bill, state plans can be retained
as long as they conform to minimum requirements at the federal level. 47 Just as
in other areas of labor law, federal standards would serve as a floor of protection,
beneath which state law may not fall, but above which states are free to legislate
137. OR. REV. STAT. § 654.182(I)(c) (1992).
138. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1991).
139. OR. REv. STAT. § 654.182 (2) (1992).
140. Id. at § 654.191(l).
141. See S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 701 (1991).
142. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-24-045 (1992).
143. See STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, WORKPLACE HAZARDs
TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, A RESOURCE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, HEALTH AND SAFETY PER-
SONNEL AND EMPLOYERS 31 (Nov. 1991).
144. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-62-054 (1984); see STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND INDUSTRIES, UNDERSTANDING "RIGHT TO KNOW," CHEMICAL HAZARD COMMUNICATION GUIDELINES
FOR WASHINGTON EMPLOYERS 3 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING RIGHT TO KNOW]
145. UNDERSTANDING RIGHT TO KNOW, supra note 144, at 16.
146. Cf. supra notes 62-63 .and accompanying text (discussing proposed changes to Title IV in S.
1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 406-08 (1991)).
147. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1001-06 (1991). Cf. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt.
Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992) (ruling that state laws were pre-empted by federal OSH laws where
OSHA had already issued standards).
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more comprehensive protection."' Because the policy behind OSHA is worker
protection, that policy is generally furthered by higher standards regarding worker
safety and health. 49 Nonetheless, the serious drawback that is endemic to state
regulation is its lack of uniformity, a problem that is particularly relevant to
standards set for work environments provided by multi-state employers.
Proponents of federal legislative reform should incorporate the best ideas
from existing state statutes and plans into COSHRA. This is a time for innovation
on a federal level, and instituting improvements regarding safety and health in
the workplace should not be left to sporadic state developments. For example,
Michigan reserves a portion of its state OSHA fines from employers to fund
education programs. This is a valuable idea, and putting federal fines to work
on education and training rather than allowing these fines to be sent to the
general U.S. Treasury would be useful. 50 Another suggested alternate use of
OSHA fines is to compensate victims of work-related accidents or injuries as
well as their families.' COSHRA does not presently contain the latter funding
scheme in its section on victim's rights, 5 2 perhaps because such a plan at this
time appears to be too ambitious in its integration of claims deemed more
appropriately brought through the workers' compensation system.
Yet, in the context of the legal environment in which businesses currently
make decisions regarding allocation of their resources, including choices about
investment in safer, healthier workplaces (where costs of workers' compensation
insurance, and potential for fines and other legal liability are carefully evaluated),
it is not too soon to coordinate OSHA and workers' compensation in a manner
that rewards employers who act responsibly. If the present COSHRA bill is to
live up to its name, it must contain a comprehensive reform of the existing
regulatory system. There may be lessons that COSHRA's proponents could learn
from examining state efforts and their OSH laws, as well as practices in other
countries.
148. A prime example of this federal-state relationship is the federal minimum wage law which
does not pre-empt the higher wages set by states. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§
201-19 (West Supp. 1992). Similarly, in the area of pregnancy discrimination, states have been
permitted to provide more by way of maternity/paternity leave than was required by the federal
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 42 U.S.C § 2000e(k) (1988). And, under the recently passed Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Congress specifically preserved state and local laws that would
provide for greater leave rights than this new federal law. The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at S-3 (Feb. 8, 1993) (discussing the Family and Medical Leave
Act's (P.L. 103-3) effect on other laws).
149. S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1001 (9) (1991) permits state safety and health programs
and SHCs and training programs "that are at least as effective as .. .(federal law]" and § 1001(10)
permits reporting requirements, that are at least as effective as . . .[federal law].
150. See Patrick R. Tyson, OSHA's Standards of Fairness, SAFETY & HEALTH 15 (Feb. 1992); cf.
S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 701 (1991) (proposed OSHA and NIOSH training provisions have
no correlating provision for funding).
151. Tyson, supra note 150. Mr. Tyson portends that if the workers' compensation system barrier
that protects employers from large potential awards for work-related injuries were removed, there
would be no need for OSHA, as employers would provide very safe workplaces to protect themselves
from tort liability. Id. at 15-16.
152. See S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., § 1101 (1991) (regarding rights of victims and their
families to information from inspections and investigations relating to work-related injuries, illnesses,
or death of an employee); see also Early, supra note 57 (discussing how current COSHRA bill model
resembles enforcement systems found in Scandinavian countries, and some Canadian provinces);
Summers, supra note 20, at 504, n.296 (discussing a few states that increase workers' compensation
awards if the employer has violated safety laws).
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VI. HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS: INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISONS
The present COSHRA bill's emphasis on employees taking an active role in
workplace safety would place the United States more in line with other western
industrialized nations.'" For example, in Sweden, safety committees for larger
companies have been required by law since 1949.154 Statutory reforms in the
1970s further encouraged worker participation and labor-management coopera-
tion, as well as established funds for research development and education.'55
Collective agreements also provided for employer funded OSH training. 5 6 Because
of the success of collective agreements in the area of safety and health, agreements
which cover eighty percent of Swedish workers, some have questioned the need
for national legislation there since the government could merely check that the
individual safety systems are working and that management and labor are
cooperating.5 7 However, a Work Environment Commission concluded that this
structure protects employees' interests and creates a necessary framework. 5
Additionally, the argument that businesses will self-regulate absent a legislative
structure or other economic incentive (such as United States employers' fear of
tort liability or increase in workers' compensation costs) is, .at its essence, a weak
one.
Interestingly, Sweden's central collective agreement (SAF-LO-PTK) permits
the number of employee representatives on the committee to exceed employer
representatives by one.119 Employee representatives are paid for time spent on
these OSH duties.1's The duties of the safety committee under the SAF-LO-PTK
agreement include gathering statistics and information, initiating investigations
and studies, and primary responsibility for company health services.1 6' These
health services have a technical section containing safety engineers and industrial
hygienists, and a medical section with doctors and nurses specializing in occu-
pational medicine. 62 This Swedish model may be worth emulating since it
integrates a number of valuable functions on site and serves as a common ground
upon which labor and management meet to address safety and health issues in
the workplace. However, this model has been criticized for its tendency to place
work environment issues outside the "corporate chain of command," and legis-
lative amendments have sought to reemphasize the employer's responsibility, with
the safety committee merely participating in planning the safety program, rather
than having exclusive responsibility.
63
153. Korostoff et al., supra note 92, at 49.
154. Id. at 50. Safety delegates in smaller companies serve a similar function to committees.
155. Id. at 51.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 52.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 53.
160. Id. at 54. In contrast, employee representatives in the U.S. are not compensated for an
OSHA walk-around. See Summers, supra note 20, at 502, n. 286. The COSHRA bill provides for
paid time for committee duties. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. The Swedish safety
delegates are by law paid for time spent on their duties. Korostoff et al., supra note 92, at 58.
161. Korostoff et al., supra note 92, at 55.




Unlike the United States' past efforts to improve OSHA's effectiveness via
increasing the punitiveness of the enforcement process, Sweden has emphasized
employer-funded safety delegate training.'" The role of the safety delegate in-
cludes the right to information and protection against harassment and discrimi-
nation. 165 In addition, the safety delegate has the right to stop hazardous work
when "there is an immediate and serious danger to the employees' life or health"
and the employees are paid during such stoppages.'" This is somewhat similar
to standards currently recognized judicially in the United States.
6
In France, employees have long participated in the enforcement of safety
and health regulations through management-labor committees that police the
work environment. 6 These health and safety committees (CHSs) were mandated
by industry and also by size, but were not very well-defined or effective, which
led to further legislation in the 1980s. 169 Now, despite a legal mandate, not all
businesses have established Health, Safety and Working Conditions Committees
(CHSCTs), although almost all industrial enterprises have functioning CHSCTs.17
0
In France, as in Sweden, nonmanagement employees comprise a majority on the
committee. '7'
Compensation for committee duties in France varies from the rate of pay
for two to twenty hours per month, but this may be changed by collective
agreements. 72 Training is only mandated for committee members in larger estab-
lishments, unlike Sweden where training is required for all employees regardless
of committee membership. 7 3 The Swedish approach is more sensible in that
training workers is vital to preservation of health and safety in the workplace.
The French CHSCTs have been criticized for being inadequately funded, lacking
in organization and effectiveness, failing to include high level managers as
committee members, and ignoring suggestions from the committee unless they
conform to the employers' preexisting plans.1 74 Despite these shortcomings, the
164. Id. at 58 (citing STEVEN KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWEDEN: A CoMPAR-
ATIVE STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY 200-01(1981)). The SAF-LO-PTK
agreement provides for 40 hours of basic training and more when necessary.
165. Korostoff et al., supra note 92, at 59.
166. Id. at 59-60.
167. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980). OSHA confers upon employees a
limited right to refuse to obey a directive of an employer where such "could reasonably be expected
to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or before the imminence of such danger can be
eliminated through the enforcement procedures otherwise provided by . . . [the Act]." Id. at 9. This
right to stop work does not include a guarantee of compensation. Id. at 18-19. The proposed
COSHRA bill provides for a statutorily prescribed right to retreat from hazards. See Korostoff et
al., supra note 92, at 79, 81.
168. Korostoff et al., supra note 92, at 63-64. This practice goes back more than one hundred
years, and safety and health committees (CHSs) were mandated in the most dangerous industries and
these CHSs were expanded in the middle of this century to encompass all industries with fifty or
more employees. Id. at 64. Later changes included large nonindustrial facilities and agricultural
employers. Id.
169. Id. at 64-65. Now generally any enterprise with fifty workers must establish a Health, Safety
and Working Conditions Committee (CHSCT) unless no employee is willing to serve. id. at 65-66.
170. Id. at 66. In smaller and/or less risky work environments, it is apparently more difficult to
peak employer-employee interest in these CHSCTs. Id. at 67.
171. Id. at 68.
172. Id. at 70.
173. Id. at 72. Training is paid for by the employer in France. Id.
174. Id. at 74.
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French system still provides for more employee participation in health and safety
matters than the current United States' system.
1 75
In Great Britain, a Health and Safety Commission's Executive branch
enforces the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) through ten inspectorates.
76
Beyond the employer's general duty with respect to ensuring a safe workplace,
employers are required to prepare a written policy for implementing workplace
safety. 77 Where applicable, unions represent employees in creating and putting
these plans into action and provide more leverage for ensuring compliance with
regulations. 
178
The British integrate paid time off of up to twenty-six weeks for medical
reasons into their HSWA, but like the French model, paid time for safety training
is limited to safety representatives.' 79 Nonunion workplaces may have informal
safety representatives but the HSWA specifies that trade unions may appoint
safety representatives from among employees and these are the representatives
who enjoy statutory rights to time off and recourse for enforcing the HSWA.180
The safety representatives in Great Britain proceed first to the collective
bargaining process for enforcement, and later may resort to the inspectorate.18'
In a unionized workplace in the United States, the health and safety committee's
avenue of recourse is generally set out in the collective bargaining agreement and
the grievance/arbitration process is frequently the outlet for resolution of differ-
ences prior to or in conjunction with OSHA intervention.
Safety committees in Great Britain are only instituted if safety representatives
request them in writing. Thus, the representatives are the primary actors, but if
formed, these committees are comprised of equal numbers from management
and labor. 8 2 Legislative activity in 1988 has increased the attention paid to worker
exposure to hazardous substances, and it is predicted that the European Com-
munity laws will generate further attention to and improvement of the health
and safety culture within Great Britain's workplaces.'83
Perhaps the most significant unifying principle derived from reviewing OSH
programs and the regulatory environment in the three countries examined above
is that the present COSHRA bill's focus on worker participation is not a new
and untried element. 8 4 Will worker participation on health and safety committees
175. Id. at 81.
176. Id. at 82-83. The inspectorates are classified by industries, i.e., agriculture, factory, aviation,
rail, mining and quarries, etc. Id.
177. Id. at 84.
178. Id. at 82, 84. The role of union as safety advocate and watchdog in the United States
appears somewhat analogous to that adopted by unions in Great Britain. Id.
179. Id. at 84. In Great Britain, unions usually provide the training for the safety representatives.
Id. at 86.
180. Id. at 85, 86 (discussing the functions of the safety representatives).
181. Id. at 87.
182. Id. at 87-88.
183. Id. at 93. See generally Terence P. Stewart & Delphine A. Abellard, Labor Laws and Social
Policies in the European Community After 1992, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 507, 566-68 (1992)
(discussing EC's policy principles regarding health and safety conditions in work environments and
EC Commission's plans for a Council directive that will define a system for information and
maximum worker exposure levels to risks and the establishment of a safety, hygiene, and health
agency).
184. See generally Korostoff et al., supra note 92, at 95 (discussing that OSH Reform Act borrows
1993]
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be effective in the United States, where there has not always been a placid history
of labor-management cooperation? A partial answer to this question may be that
union membership has declined in the United States, so fewer workers enjoy the
safety and health representation and advocacy that unions have traditionally
provided. Simultaneously, OSHA's ineffectiveness has led to a movement to
institute better internal review of our work environments. While employers remain
primarily responsible for the integrity of these environments, workers have an
equivalent stake in the matter in that their physical well-being depends upon
vigilance with respect to health and safety matters.8 5 Special attention should be
paid to improving this cooperative relationship. The long overlooked effects of
occupational hazards on the reproductive province must be addressed now so
that workers and their offspring are no longer the canaries in the twenty-first
century.
VII. CONCLUSION
Reproductive and developmental health hazards are a significant problem in
terms of the number of people affected and the pervasiveness of toxins across
all work environments. Moreover, there exists a heightened concern about the
many environmental issues, especially those that negatively impact fragile human
systems. With the advent of worker right to know laws and hazards communi-
cation standards, more information is becoming available. Because of these trends,
an awareness has developed that will inevitably lead to demands for safer, cleaner,
healthier workplaces.
For this problem to be effectively addressed, both private worksite-based
programs should be implemented, and a comprehensive public initiative should
be passed and enforced. Presently there are few private programs in place. In
the public sector, the present COSHRA bill begins a process, but the level of
attention to the critical issue of reproductive and developmental hazards remains
woefully inadequate.
Against this backdrop of increased concern, proposed legislation and possibly
more attentive agency oversight, it behooves employees and employers to begin
crafting RHPs now within the context of broader safety and health programs.
This strategy takes the important step of safeguarding employers' economic well-
being, the safety and health of all workers, and their offspring.
the elements of worker participation from these systems). Japanese firms also follow company policies
of joint consultation between management and workers via joint committees. The existence of joint
committees and their discussion of matters such as occupational safety and health is mandated by
law. Ronald C. Brown, Labor Law Issues Facing Multinational and Japanese Companies Operating
in the United States and United States Companies Using Japanese-Style Labor Relations: Agenda
Items Under the "New Labor Relations," 8 U. HAW. L. REv. 261, 269 & n.29 (1986) (citing
Masahiro Ken Kuwahara, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in Japan, 5 COMP.
LAB. L. 51, 54 (1982)).
185. See Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINoS L.J. 661, 677 (1992)
(discussing need for workplace medical surveillance and limiting worker exposure to hazardous
chemicals); OFFICE OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, EFFECTS OF OCCUPA-
TIONAL HEALTH HAzARDs ON REPRODUCTIVE FUNCTIONS, 4 (1987) (reporting on epidemiological
information, identifying areas requiring further research and recommending development of a register
of reproductive health effects of occupational hazards).
